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Abstract	  
In the past few decades Japan has experienced changes in its marital institution. Japanese men and 
women have started to postpone marriage and childbearing or remain unmarried, and the number of 
divorces have increased. Exactly the changes in marriage trends have been the point of departure of 
this study. The purpose of this study was to focus attention on Japanese marriage. Specifically, this 
thesis has explored in what way the institution of marriage has changed and whether it has 
deinstitutionalized in Japan since the 1970s. By following the historical development of the marital 
institution in Japan from the 1970s until today and using the theory of deinstitutionalization of 
marriage the main conclusion of this study is that despite changes, Japanese marriage has not been 
deinstitutionalized. Strong attitudinal changes have taken place in favour of a less gendered division 
of labour. However, Japan has experienced few cohabiting relationships, extramarital childbirths, 
and the rules for same-sex partnerships have changed gradually. Characteristic for Japanese 
marriage has been its distinctive development since the 1970s with a coexistence of change and 
persistence of legal rules as well as social norms.  
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Keywords: Japan, marriage, institution, deinstitutionalization   
	  
2	  
Acknowledgements	  
I would like to thank a few people who have helped me along the way during the thesis process and 
the two years in Lund. Thank you to my classmates and friends for making Lund a better place to 
be, the Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies in Lund for two educational years, and a huge 
thank you to my supervisor Ingemar for the challenging comments, helpful supervision, and for 
sharing your broad knowledge about Japan with me. Lastly, a lot of gratitude goes to my family for 
always believing in me. And to Tobias, your support has been invaluable to me. 	  
  
	  
3	  
Table	  of	  contents	  
1.	   Introduction	  ..............................................................................................................	  4	  
2.	   Historical	  overview	  of	  the	  Japanese	  marriage	  .........................................................	  6	  
2.1.	  Arranged	  marriage	  from	  the	  Edo	  period	  to	  World	  War	  II	  ...........................................................	  6	  
2.2.	  From	  arranged	  marriage	  to	  love	  marriage	  in	  post-­‐war	  Japan	  .....................................................	  8	  
3.	   Literature	  review	  ......................................................................................................	  9	  
4.	   Theory	  .....................................................................................................................	  15	  
4.1.	  The	  concepts	  of	  institution	  and	  marriage	  .................................................................................	  15	  
4.2.	  Deinstitutionalization	  and	  marriage	  as	  an	  informal	  institution	  ................................................	  16	  
4.3.	  Deinstitutionalization	  and	  marriage	  as	  a	  formal	  institution	  ......................................................	  17	  
4.4.	  Deinstitutionalization	  and	  alternatives	  to	  marriage	  .................................................................	  18	  
5.	   Research	  question	  ..................................................................................................	  19	  
6.	   Research	  design	  ......................................................................................................	  20	  
6.1.	  Ontology	  and	  epistemology	  ......................................................................................................	  20	  
6.2.	  Method	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  ........................................................................................	  20	  
6.3.	  Data	  collection...........................................................................................................................	  22	  
6.4.	  Reliability	  and	  validity	  ...............................................................................................................	  23	  
6.5.	  Ethical	  considerations	  ...............................................................................................................	  24	  
6.6.	  Limitations	  .................................................................................................................................	  24	  
7.	   Analysis	  ...................................................................................................................	  25	  
7.1.	  The	  four	  developments	  in	  the	  deinstitutionalization	  of	  Japanese	  marriage	  .............................	  25	  
7.1.5.	  Formal	  and	  informal	  rules	  and	  marriage	  as	  a	  status	  symbol	  .............................................	  31	  
7.2.	  Causes	  for	  the	  change	  of	  the	  marital	  institution:	  Cultural	  and	  material	  trends	  ........................	  33	  
7.2.1.	  Emotional	  satisfaction	  and	  individualism	  ...........................................................................	  33	  
7.2.2.	  Educational	  and	  occupational	  advancement	  .....................................................................	  34	  
7.3	  Few	  cohabiting	  couples	  and	  extramarital	  childbirths	  ................................................................	  37	  
8.	   Conclusion	  ...............................................................................................................	  39	  
9.	  	  	  	  Bibliography	  ............................................................................................................	  41	  
10.	  	  Appendix	  .................................................................................................................	  46	  
	   	  
	  
4	  
1.   Introduction	  
The institution of marriage has been changing in Japan since the 1970s (Fukuda 2013: 107; 
Tokuhiro 2009: 4). To an increasing extent Japanese men and women delay marriage or decide not 
to marry at all. From 1970 to 2013 the mean age for first marriage increased from 26.9 to 30.9 for 
men and 24.2 to 29.3 for women (Raymo et al. 2015: 474, 476; Statistics Bureau Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications Japan 2015: 18-19). Likewise the proportion of never-married 
people at age 50 increased between 1980 and 2010 from 2.6 percent to 20.2 percent for men and 
from 4.5 to 10.7 percent for women. The postponement of marriage and the rise of never-married 
people have had consequences for the fertility in Japan due to the tight link between marriage and 
childbearing (Rindfuss et al. 2009: 218; Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2010). Few 
children are born outside marriage and extramarital childbearing is not accepted in society. The 
fertility rate in Japan has been low for many years and below the replacement level of 2.1 births per 
woman since 1971. The low fertility is estimated to result in a substantial population shrinkage 
during the next decades. It has increasingly become a concern in society, and politically it has been 
recognized as a compelling problem since the 1990s (Suzuki 2008: 161-162).  
 
Not only has the institution of marriage changed as a result of a delay and opting out of marriage. 
Attitudes regarding the purpose of marriage have also changed. Marriage used to be of practical 
importance as it was considered the right way to start life with a family (Raymo 1998: 1023: Tsuya 
and Bumpass 2004: 39; Tokuhiro 2009: 17-18; Yang and Yen 2011: 752-753). Moreover, marriage 
ensured a continuation of family lines and it preserved traditional gender roles within the family. 
Today attitudes have changed, especially among the young Japanese men and women. The vast 
majority of marriages are now based on mutual consent, romance, and love. Despite these changes 
in the marital institution, marriage is still the norm in Japan (Tokuhiro 2009: 2). Furthermore, most 
single Japanese men and women express a desire to marry and the majority of people would also 
like to have children (Raymo et al. 2015: 479). To married women the ideal number of children has 
only changed slightly since the late 1970s. In 1977 the ideal number of children was 2.6 and it 
decreased to 2.4 in 2010.     
 
The demographic changes in the marital institution have not only happened in Japan. Japan has 
experienced delay in marriage, increase in divorces, people who remain unmarried, and female 
employment (Raymo et al. 2004: 396-397). These demographic changes as well as a notable growth 
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of cohabitation and childbirths outside marriage have also taken place in western industrialized 
countries. The developments have been termed the “second demographic transition”. The “first 
demographic transition” refers to the decline in fertility and mortality the western countries started 
to experience in the 18th and 19th century. (Lesthaeghe 2010a: 211-212; Lesthaeghe 2010b: 3). The 
first signs of the developments of the second demographic transition began in the U.S. and 
Scandinavia in the 1950s with an increasing number of divorces. In the late 1960s fertility started to 
decline in the western countries together with a rising age at first marriage and never-married 
people. It was followed by a rise in cohabitation and childbirths outside marriage. Despite 
similarities, Japanese marriage trends have features which sets Japan apart from western countries. 
The marriage trends are shared with the two other East Asian countries Taiwan and South Korea 
(Raymo et al. 2015: 472). Characteristic for the three East Asian countries are strong family ties, 
family lineage, and the continued gender division of labour in the home.  
 
Exactly the changes in the Japanese marital institution which have already taken place and the 
apparent similarity of marriage trends Japan shares with the two East Asian countries, Taiwan and 
South Korea, as well as the U.S. and countries in Western Europe have been the motivation behind 
the topic of this thesis. The main aim of this thesis is to look deeper into changes of Japan’s marital 
institution. Particularly, I want to explore in what way the institution of marriage has changed and 
whether it has deinstitutionalized since the 1970s. Previous literature on deinstitutionalization has 
mainly focused on the U.S. and Europe and rarely included East Asian countries (Davis and 
Friedman 2014: 3; Yang and Yen 2011: 753, 757). Therefore, with this study I seek to broaden the 
knowledge and the scope of the existing literature on deinstitutionalization by analysing the 
deinstitutionalization of Japanese marriage. The main conclusion in this thesis is that Japanese 
marriage has changed but it has not been deinstitutionalized since the 1970s. The country has 
experienced a strong attitudinal change in favour of a more gender equal division of labour in the 
home. However, regarding the three other distinctive developments of the deinstitutionalization 
process, growth of cohabitation, emergence of same-sex marriage, and increase of extramarital 
childbearing they are either relatively recent developments or not significant phenomena in the 
Japanese society. The changes Japan have experienced in the marital institution seem to have been 
influenced by both cultural and material trends. Especially the cultural ideas and values of 
emotional fulfilment and individualism and the material trends of advancement to higher education, 
which have resulted in better occupational opportunities for mainly women, seem to have been 
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influential factors behind the changed institution of marriage. Despite changes in the Japanese 
marital institution, Japanese marriage has developed in a distinctive way characterized by 
institutional rigidity, both in terms of legal rules and social norms, which do not seem likely to 
change at the present moment. The rigidity of the marital institution may be consequence of the 
relative absence of certain developments in Japan, namely an early female-dominant contraceptive 
method, equal responsibility between husband and wife of domestic tasks, and a value change 
diminishing traditional beliefs. Furthermore, persistent family and childbearing norms are likely 
obstacles to extramarital childbearing.  
 
The thesis is structured as follows: First, a historical background of the Japanese marriage is 
outlined to give an overview of the development of the marital institution before the changes in the 
1970s. Subsequently, the literature review is touched upon. Next, the thesis’ theoretical framework 
of deinstitutionalization is explained. The following two sections describe the research question and 
the research design. Afterwards the analysis is presented. The analysis is divided into three main 
parts where the first part focuses on the change of Japanese marriage since the 1970s, the second 
part points out influential causes for these changes, and the third part emphasizes factors which 
have resulted in the rigidity of the Japanese marital institution. The thesis ends with a concluding 
section. 
	  
2.  Historical	  overview	  of	  the	  Japanese	  marriage	  	  
In this section a historical background of the Japanese marriage will be presented from the Edo 
period to the post-war years. The section will give an overview of the marital institution before the 
changes in the 1970s.  
	  
2.1.	  Arranged	  marriage	  from	  the	  Edo	  period	  to	  World	  War	  II	  	  	  	  
To understand the development of the marital institution in Japan it is important to look at the 
historical background. In the pre-war years marriage was considered the decent way to start life 
with a partner, and marriage was a way to secure continuation of the family lineage (Kumagai 2008: 
33; Tokuhiro 2009: 17-18, 93). For the most part, marriages were arranged by family members 
(Tokuhiro 2009: 93-95). Together with relatives, parents took part in the selection of prospective 
partners for their children. Subsequently, the marriage was typically arranged by matchmakers. In 
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the search to find a suitable partner for their child parents thought of the interests of their family. 
Arranged marriages were a consequence of the structure of the ie family system in Japan. Ie was 
established in the Edo or Tokugawa period (1603-1867) and can be translated to stem family. Ie has 
both a co-residential and functional meaning (Kumagai 1995:138). Where the co-residential 
meaning signifies the succession of the stem family with a vertical ordering of nuclear families 
from each generation, the functional meaning refers to the household where everyone performs a 
given role to maintain the ie unit. As the head of the family was responsible for the selection of 
eligible partners for the family members, a suitable partner was selected based on background and 
social status since these qualifications would determine later contacts, social status, and future 
opportunities for the couple (Tokuhiro 2009: 93-95). Marriage also involved bringing a daughter-in-
law or a son-in-law into the house to continue family lines. If a family did not have a son, the son-
in-law would take over family responsibilities. A daughter-in-law who was brought into the 
husband’s family would get instructions from her mother-in-law about the ways of her in-laws’ 
family. Thus, match-making was not only important to the individual but also to the family. In the 
Edo period, the unit of social organization was composed of the lineal family (Yoshino 1992: 65). 
 
During the Edo era the ie system mainly existed for the upper class of warriors and aristocrats, and 
it was especially people in the upper class who married through the arranged marriages (Kumagai 
2010: 587; Kumagai 1995: 138; Tokuhiro 2009: 94). The control of the head of the family was 
stricter in these families compared to the lower classes of peasants, artisans, merchants, and eta 
(outcasts). It was a result of the moral code of Confucianism which primarily applied to people of 
higher ranks. Parental control was less pronounced among the peasants and an egalitarian familial 
relationship existed to some extent in these families. Consequently, when it came to matchmaking, 
the opinion of the children of peasants was valued. In the Edo period, peasants constituted about 80 
to 90 percent of the population and warriors 7 to 10 percent. Another reason for the arranged 
marriages were the segregation of young unmarried men and women in Japan at that time (Tokuhiro 
2009: 93, 95). It resulted in lack of confidence and experience with the opposite sex. As a result 
young men and women would rely on parents and matchmakers to find suitable partners. However, 
among peasants the segregation of men and women was less strict and mostly applied in public. For 
instance, it was accepted to have contact with the other sex in hidden places. Villages had lodges 
where young people could meet and form unions which were based on personal choice of the young 
men and women.  
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After the Edo period, the Meiji period (1868-1912) followed (Kumagai 1995: 135, 137-139, 159; 
Kumagai 2010: 587; Tokuhiro 2009: 95-96, 97). In this period Japan was modernized as the first 
country in East Asia through social, political, and economic reforms. Confucian norms were 
strengthened and spread in society from warriors to peasants. The moral code of Confucianism 
stressed the importance of justice, personal virtue, and devotion to the family. Also, the ideas of the 
integrated family were expanded to the state-level as part of the nation-building process in the 
country (Yoshino 1992: 65-66). To unify the country, the Meiji government adopted the conception 
of the state as a family. The Emperor was head of the family-state and values of filial piety and 
loyalty to the Emperor were implemented in the school system. During the Meiji period interaction 
between men and women were restrained even further as it came to apply to all social classes 
(Kumagai 1995: 138-139; Kumagai 2010: 587; Kumagai 2015: 47; Tokuhiro 2009: 95-96). 
Segregation of men and women was considered virtuous in society. With the Meiji Restoration in 
1868, the feudal era and class system were brought to an end and promulgated in the 1898 Civil 
Code. The ie system came to characterize the lower classes as well as the upper class and all social 
strata became part of a hierarchical organization. Under the Civil Code, marriage required 
permission from the head of the house and from the parents of the man and woman when they were 
under 30 and 25 respectively. It meant that marital match-making was controlled by the parents and 
it was not possible to have a say in the matter of selecting one’s future husband or wife. It was 
unusual for a couple to express a desire to marry for love because it was challenging the objective 
decision of an arranged marriage made by their parents. Therefore, instead of modernizing the 
family, the Meiji Restoration ended up strengthening the hierarchical structure of the Japanese 
family. The ie system lasted until the Civil Code was revised in 1947 with the new constitution after 
World War II. 
 
2.2.	  From	  arranged	  marriage	  to	  love	  marriage	  in	  post-­‐war	  Japan	  
After World War II, the Meiji Civil Code was revised. With the American occupation following the 
war a new constitution was signed in 1946 and it came into effect in 1947 (Tokuhiro 2009: 18, 97; 
Kumagai 1995: 139). The occupation induced legal changes to the institution of marriage and a 
modernization of the Japanese family. The revised Civil Code abolished the ie system and the idea 
of the nuclear family was introduced. Subsequently, the family unit only included husband, wife, 
and children. Generations in a family such as the son’s family and his parents’ family became 
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separate units and they received an equal position in the family. The constitution from 1947 made it 
possible for both men and women to marry without their parents’ consent and it included equal 
rights for women. Moreover, one of the aims of the constitution was to safeguard the dignity of the 
individual and equality of men and women in the family. Yet, the ideals of equality and 
independence in the family were never entirely met and arranged marriages continued to be the 
norm and accepted way of forming a union in the Japanese society for years after the legal change. 
Until the late 1960s, arranged marriages exceeded the number of love marriages. However, with 
modernization and the import of western and particularly American culture after World War II, 
rules for interaction between sexes and matchmaking loosened gradually (Kumagai 1995: 135, 145-
146, 152, 158-159; Tokuhiro 2009: 97). Relationships based on love and values of individualism 
and egalitarianism spread to Japan, especially to the younger generations. It resulted in a change of 
the reasons and the purpose for marrying. The primary purpose was no longer exclusively a concern 
about family matters and the continuation of the ie system. Instead marriage was to an increasing 
extent based on love and mutual consent. 
 
Despite these changes, there continues to be a coexistence of modern and traditional elements of 
marriage and the family in Japan (Kumagai 1995: 135, 152, 158-159; Tokuhiro 2009: 97). Modern 
elements have been brought to Japan from the West with ideas of the nuclear family and romance. 
Still, traditional elements are to be found in marriage as well as family life. Separate gender roles 
persist in Japanese marriage, and the Japanese family is characterized by vertical generational ties 
from the ie system. Additionally, values of filial piety and subordination to the Emperor or one’s 
superior continue to influence social interaction. Subordination to a superior is reflected by the 
hierarchical Japanese society and the seniority system at work places. Thus, Japanese marriage and 
family structures have been influenced by western ideals of modernization but at the same time the 
country has kept traditional elements.  
	  
3.  Literature	  review	  
This section presents the review of the literature on Japanese marriage. Marriage is a topic many 
scholars have written about. In the marriage literature the topic has mainly been addressed from 
either a sociological, economic, or demographic perspective.  
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Sociologist Arland Thornton has developed the theoretical framework of developmental idealism, 
and the framework has been used to analyse family patterns in Japan (Raymo et al. 2015: 473). 
After World War II a modernization process and family change took place in the country which 
were highly influenced by the West (Kumagai 1995: 135, 158; Tokuhiro 2009: 97). Particularly, 
Japan was influenced by western policies, culture, and ideals regarding modernization and 
economic development (Raymo et al. 2015: 473; Thornton et al. 2012: 679). Also, in its 
modernization process, Japan seemed influenced by the cultural model of developmental idealism. 
Developmental idealism is developed in a Western European context and has been an important 
framework for evaluating modern family patterns and change regarding living arrangement, 
marriage, divorce, and gender relations around the world (Thornton 2001: 449, 454). To Thornton, 
developmental idealism is a grouping of “the main ideals, beliefs, and propositions concerning 
family life” (Thornton 2001: 454-455, 457). Thornton argues that developmental idealism has been 
an influential way to think about modern societies and family patterns, and he suggests that 
developmental idealism has brought changes in family attitudes and behaviour. Many constituting 
parts of developmental idealism originate from western societies, and western cultures and family 
patterns have been considered superior to other countries’ cultures as they have been regarded 
modern and developed. Developmental idealism consists of four normative propositions (ibid.: 454-
455). First, modern society is considered good and attainable. Modern society refers to social and 
economic development such as industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and educational progress. 
Second, modern family is good and attainable. A modern family refers to the existence of 
individualism, high valuation of women, nuclear households, and an absence of arranged marriages. 
Third, modern family is a cause and an effect of modern society. Thus, the transformation from a 
traditional to a modern society will create and cause a modern family system, and the effect of a 
modern society is that one has to accept the modern family system. Fourth, individuals are free and 
equal and social relationships are based on consent. Thornton argues that the ideas or propositions, 
separately or together, can be influential if people believe them and are motivated by them. In this 
way they can potentially guide ideas, behaviour and relationships. Moreover, the link between ideas 
and development gives people outside of Western Europe a motivation to adopt western family 
trends as the ideas imply a dynamic world with a movement from traditional to modern societies 
(Thornton 2001: 460-461; Thornton et al. 2012: 680). Therefore, the ideas can potentially 
homogenize the way we think about development in a society (Thornton 2001: 460-461). For 
instance, societies are linguistically divided into developing and developed societies or described as 
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consisting of developmental stages such as the first demographic transition and the second 
demographic transition. Still, Thornton stresses that developmental idealism does not provide the 
full explanation for these changes in the different countries around the world. Furthermore, even 
though developmental idealism makes family patterns susceptible to change, many cross-country 
indigenous family patterns still persist. This is also the case for Japan and other East Asian societies 
(Raymo et al. 2015: 471, 473).     
 
Like developmental idealism, the sociological exposure-based explanation suggests that individuals 
can change and develop their understanding of gender relations and attitudes toward feminist issues 
by being exposed to similar ideas (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004: 761-762; Yang and Yen 2011: 
756). The exposure-based explanation has been included in the analysis of marital dissolution and 
changes in marital attitudes in the East Asian countries, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. It predicts 
that if an individual is exposed to ideas that are supportive of gender equality, he or she will be 
more likely to adopt liberal attitudes. Exposure can for example be encouraged through education. 
Education can present ideas and alternative perspectives about women’s roles in society. The role of 
education in shaping attitudes is an essential element in East Asia (Yang and Yen 2011: 756). 
Together with Taiwan and South Korea, Japan has experienced increasing educational advancement 
for women in recent years. Besides education, personal experience can be a source of changing 
attitudes for women (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004: 762). It can take place in the labour market 
where women can be exposed to inequality between men and women at work, dismiss myths about 
women’s capabilities at work, and engage in social networks with other women. For a long time 
Japanese women have experienced gender bias at the work place as the Japanese labour market has 
been unfavourable to women in general and to married women with children in particular (Brinton 
2001: 24, 130; Raymo and Iwasawa 2005: 805). 
 
Another theoretical approach used to analyse the change of the Japanese marital institution is 
sociologist Anthony Giddens’ postmodern perspective about individualism (Cherlin 2004: 853; 
Giddens 1992: 58, 63; Yang and Yen 2011: 757). In the individualist perspective, the marital 
institution has undergone change as a result of the increasing individualization of personal life. 
Individualization and personal choice are growing as a result of the decreasing power of the social 
norms and laws which are regulating family life. Since the influence of previous sources of identity 
of class, community, and religion have been reduced it has opened up for the intimate relationships 
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to become an essential part of the self-identity. Consequently, Giddens stresses that marriage for a 
lot of people has moved toward the “pure relationship” where “the social relation is entered for its 
own sake… and which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough 
satisfactions for each individual to stay within it” (Giddens 1992: 58). However, the pure 
relationship is not tied to the marital institution or childrearing and it is not regulated by law 
(Cherlin 2004: 853, 858; Giddens 1992: 63). It is held together by the mutual benefits each partner 
receives from the relationship and it will last until one or both of the parties’ benefits are viewed as 
insufficient to stay in the relationship. The pure relationship can be considered an extension of the 
individualization and change of the marital institution that have taken place in many western 
countries in the 20th century. It can bring equality to the relationship and intimacy and love to both 
partners. At the same time each partner has the opportunity for personal development. With this 
development, marriage has become one out of many ways in which an individual can be in a 
relationship. Likewise, Japan has experienced a similar development (Yang and Yen 2011: 757-
758). To an increasing extent Japanese men and women express that emotional satisfaction and 
individual development are important in a relationship.  
   
Other studies have included economic theory by Gary Becker in the analyses of marriage, and the 
economic theory by Becker is based on a traditional gender role division with the man as 
breadwinner and the woman as responsible for the household (Becker 1991: 108, 110, 113; Cherlin 
2004: 854; Tokuhiro 2009: 22; Raymo and Iwasawa 2005: 801). In the economic theory of 
marriage, men and women are relatively more productive in each of their work area which makes 
marriage beneficial to both men and women if one is specialised in the labour market and the other 
in domestic labour. Men and women have something different to offer which gives them an 
incentive to marry. In this way men and women pool their individual gains and can achieve 
maximum benefits from marriage. One of the main reasons for the postponement of marriage and 
fewer marriages in the developed countries today is the rise in women’s economic independence. 
The increase of women’s advancement in higher education and participation in the labour market 
will decrease the gains men and women get from marriage. Consequently, it will become less 
desirable to marry. The theory is interesting in a Japanese context where traditional gender roles 
persist (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005: 801, 805-806; Tokuhiro 2009: 22). At the same time, Japanese 
women have greater access to well-paid jobs today. Moreover, educational patterns have changed. 
Women have experienced a remarkable increase in advancement in higher education since the first 
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Fundamental Law of 1947 which entailed “Equal opportunities of education and equality of the 
sexes” (OECD 2011: 149). Contributing to the change has been the increase in women’s university 
enrolment and the fact that university degrees are linked to significantly higher salaries. However, 
Becker’s theory can also be less fruitful in the analysis of Japanese marriage patterns because it 
leaves out factors such as norms and culture (Tokuhiro 2009: 22-23). It is possible that cultural 
variation will produce different values, norms, and beliefs in different countries. As a result, it will 
lead to cross cultural differences in values and the way people view marriage.  
 
Besides the sociological and economic approaches, demographic studies have also analysed 
Japanese marriage. Some studies have focused on the “package” women face when entering 
marriage (Raymo et al. 2015: 473; Rindfuss et al. 2004: 841; Rindfuss et al. 2009: 215, 217-218, 
220; Piotrowski et al. 2015: 1042-1043). They argue that this has influenced the changes in 
marriage patterns that have happened in Japan. Rindfuss et al. (2009) point out that Japan continues 
to be a highly gender segregated society. Also, when marrying especially women face a package of 
family expectations and obligations in the family. In the marriage package marriage, childbearing, 
childrearing, and care for the elderly are interlinked where women are expected to commit 
themselves to these responsibilities. Especially the link between marriage and childbearing is 
related to a strong obligation to having children after a couple marries. Non-marital childbirths are 
disapproved and stigmatized in society and today only 2 percent of children are born outside 
marriage. This is also evident from the increasing amount of pregnant brides where the couple’s 
first child is born shortly after they marry. Moreover, part of the decline in fertility Japan is 
experiencing is a result of the postponement of marriage. After having children, obligations of 
childrearing also persist. It is the woman’s responsibility that the children achieve educational 
success. Because of the competitive educational system in Japan, this becomes a demanding task 
for mothers as it requires help with homework and preparation for cram schools and entrance 
exams. Therefore, the marriage package can be unattractive for young and particularly well-
educated women. For women, who carry out most of the household tasks, it becomes difficult to 
have a job while the children are young. Consequently, many women withdraw from the labour 
market when they have children. The M-shaped curve of women’s labour market participation 
exemplifies this. After leaving their jobs when they have children, women tend to enter the labour 
market again when the children are older. At the same time, it can be difficult to find regular 
employment again when they re-enter the labour market.  
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Demographic research has also analysed the changes in marriage and the emergence of alternatives 
to marriage as part of broader family changes that have happened in Japan. The changes have been 
described as being similar to the developments of the “second demographic transition” (Raymo et 
al. 2004: 396-397; Raymo et al. 2015: 472, 479: Lesthaeghe 2010a: 211-212). The second 
demographic transition describes significant changes in family behaviour that have occurred in 
industrial countries in the 1950s. Characteristic for the changes in this transition is delayed marriage 
and childbearing, a rise in female employment, cohabitation, divorces, and non-marital 
childbearing. While some of the family changes are already prevalent in Japan such as 
postponement of marriage, low fertility, and an increasing number of divorces, the rest of the 
characteristics are either not prevalent or have only been developing slowly. Compared with other 
industrialized countries, female labour force participation is lower, cohabiting unions are fewer, and 
non-marital childbearing has been almost absent in Japan.  
 
Of the demographic changes in Japan, not much research has been conducted about the topic of 
divorce until recently (Raymo et al. 2004: 397, 399; Raymo et al. 2015: 478; Rindfuss et al. 2009: 
223; Yang and Yen 2011: 752). This is also a result of limited available data. Divorce in Japan has 
become an interesting topic due to the recent changes in divorce patterns. Traditional marriage 
provided stability for both parties. Divorce was unlikely as it was associated with bringing 
dishonour to the family and social stigma for women. Even though a marriage did not necessarily 
bring happiness, the wife was able to expect economic security and the husband could expect that 
the household and children were taken care of. For a large part of the 20th century the amount of 
divorces in Japan were low. This has started to change in the 1960s and the number increased 
steadily after 1990. Together with the development of the Japanese society, social norms have also 
changed and divorce is no longer a taboo. Today, about one-third of marriages are projected to end 
in divorce. Previous studies have focused on the relationship between educational level and divorce 
in Japan. Although divorces have been increasing for all educational groups, there is an outspoken 
tendency for divorce to occur more often for people with less education and fewer socioeconomic 
resources (Raymo et al. 2015: 478; Raymo et al. 2004: 405-406). This is similar to divorce trends 
and findings of studies about experiences of the second demographic transition in other 
industrialized countries. The effect of educational differences on likelihood of divorce was marginal 
in 1980 but it has increased substantially since then. Japan’s marital dissolution has also been 
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compared with neighbouring countries of Taiwan and South Korea (Yang and Yen 2011: 768; 
Statistics Bureau Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan 2015: 19). Before the late 
1980s, Japan’s divorce rate (per 1,000 population), was higher than the divorce rates in Taiwan and 
South Korea. Possibly it was a consequence of Japan’s more liberal attitudes that occurred with its 
earlier industrialization and social and economic development. However, since then the divorce rate 
has been the lowest of the three countries. In all three countries divorce is now a valid option and it 
indicates the individualization of divorce. This points toward a change in gender relations between 
married men and women.  
 
4.  Theory	  
In the previous section the literature review about Japanese marriage has been outlined. The 
literature review has highlighted three general approaches to the analysis of marriage in Japan: a 
sociological, economic, and demographic approach. This thesis will have a sociological approach in 
the analysis of the institution of marriage and include the theory of deinstitutionalization. Before the 
theoretical framework is presented, important concepts will be explained. 
 
4.1.	  The	  concepts	  of	  institution	  and	  marriage	  	  
As this paper focuses on the changing marital institution in Japan, two concepts are important to 
define before the theoretical framework is explained: institution and marriage. An institution is 
commonly defined as “rules” which can refer to both formal rules and informal rules such as social 
norms (Steinmo 2008: 123-124; Thelen 1999: 377). An institution can structure and have effects on 
outcomes and individual behaviour (Steinmo 2008: 125-126). For instance, formal institutions have 
the capacity to legally restrict behaviour (Pierson 2000: 256, 259). Moreover, once established, 
institutions can be difficult to change because individuals invest and adapt to already existing 
institutional arrangements. With individual investment in an institutional arrangement, the 
institution can become rigid because the existing institution is favoured over alternative institutions. 
There has been more disagreement about a proper definition of marriage (Tokuhiro 2009: 6-7). The 
concept of marriage can be difficult to define because different arrangement are made around 
relationships in industrialized societies. One definition of marriage is that it is “an institution that 
governs the organization of household production through two adults assumed to be permanently 
living together in the same house, pooling resources, managing housework, and market work, 
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reproducing, and socializing children” (Lauer and Yodanis 2010: 60). However, by mainly stressing 
the intimate relationship, cohabitation also seems to be included in this definition of marriage. 
Therefore, besides stressing the private and intimate relationship between two people, a definition 
of marriage should also consider the fact that marriage is a public institution as it needs public 
recognition. “To be marriage, the institution requires public affirmation… More definitely, legal 
marriage requires state sanction in the licence and ceremony” (Cott 2000: 1-2). Furthermore, 
marriage is public in the sense that it “allocates and legitimates societal privileges, rights, resources, 
and obligations” (Davis and Friedman 2014: 4).  
 
4.2.	  Deinstitutionalization	  and	  marriage	  as	  an	  informal	  institution	  
Andrew Cherlin is one of the leading scholars within the marriage literature, and he has developed a 
sociological theory of marriage (Lauer and Yodanis 2010: 58) The theory has been developed in an 
American context but it provides insights to some of the important factors that can result in a 
deinstitutionalization of the marital institution. Cherlin defines deinstitutionalization as “the 
weakening of social norms that define people’s behavior in a social institution such as marriage” 
(Cherlin 2004: 848). Cherlin analyses the change of the marital institution in the U.S. He points out 
that certain developments have contributed to the deinstitutionalization after the 1970s in the U.S. 
and they have changed the meaning of marriage in the 20th century (ibid.: 848-851). First, the 
growth of cohabitation where cohabitation or unmarried-couple households increasingly have 
become an alternative to marriage even though there are regional differences. Second, the 
emergence of same-sex marriage. Third, the change in the division of labour which is not strictly 
related to gender, but instead every couple has to figure out the division of labour which works for 
them. Fourth, the increase of births outside marriage and the acceptance of non-marital childbirths 
in society.  
 
The four developments have been a result of cultural and material trends which have changed the 
meaning of marriage in the U.S. (Cherlin 2004: 851-852). Cultural trends revolve around the 
importance of romantic love and individualism. Material trends include the increase in wage labour, 
rising standard of living, and women entering the paid labour force. Together with historical events 
of the Depression and World War II, the cultural and material developments have changed the 
meaning of marriage in a distinct way during the 20th century. Between the 1950s and 1970s 
marriage changed from an institutional to a companionate marriage and later to an individualized 
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marriage. In the institutional marriage, marriage was the predominant way to live with a partner, 
children were born within marriage, divorces were few, traditional gender roles prevailed, and 
family values were important (ibid.: 857). It changed with the companionate marriage where 
husband and wife were considered lovers and friends, and emotional satisfaction became important 
in a marriage (ibid.: 851). In the beginning of the 1960s, marriage patterns started to change in the 
U.S. More people married later or remained single and divorce, cohabitation, extramarital 
childbearing, and same-sex partnerships gained greater acceptance. Furthermore, the household 
division of labour was altered as both men and women started to work outside the home. For 
women, the increasing economic independence meant that marriage became less important for 
economic security (Cherlin 1981: 75). With these changes, marriage became more individualized 
during the 1960s and especially the 1970s (Cherlin 2004: 852). In the individualized marriage, self-
development, individualism, and to a greater extent emotional satisfaction became essential.  
 
Despite the changes, marriage has remained an important institution in the U.S. and most people 
still choose to marry (Cherlin 1981: 74; Cherlin 2004: 853-854; Cherlin 2013). According to 
Cherlin it is due to the symbolic significance of marriage. Couples continue to value the institution 
of marriage when they decide how to live their lives with a partner. Also, marriage is the norm in 
the light of an increasing acceptance of cohabiting unions. Previously, marriage has been a marker 
of conventionality for couples, but today it can be looked upon as a marker of prestige. 
Increasingly, couples who wish to marry would like to wait until they are settled and financially 
secure. Marriage is strived for but it is not the obvious consequence of a relationship if they are not 
able to maintain a stable life and economy. Thus, marriage has to a large extent become a status 
symbol.  
 
4.3.	  Deinstitutionalization	  and	  marriage	  as	  a	  formal	  institution	  
Like Cherlin, Sean Lauer and Carrie Yodanis have an institutional approach to marriage in the U.S., 
but they do not only focus on informal rules of behaviour of the institution of marriage. Instead the 
authors also stress the importance of formal rules in the analysis of the marital institution and 
deinstitutionalization (Lauer and Yodanis 2010: 59). To Lauer and Yodanis “Marriage as an 
institution is a set of rules and assumption that govern social behaviors” (Lauer and Yodanis 2010: 
60) and the rules can be both formal and informal. Formal rules are developed in the polity, the 
bureaucracy, or other organizations, and informal rules develop outside formal organizations when 
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people form a shared sense of behaviour. The formal, legal rights are tied to marriage, and 
unmarried people do not have these rights (Lauer and Yodanis 2010: 62, 65; Cherlin 2004: 853). 
Informal rules such as norms support the legal rules. In terms of marriage, informal rules persist in 
the sense that the majority of married couples live together, raise children together, pool their 
incomes, and live in monogamous relationships. Thus, people want to marry, they know what the 
marital institution entails and what it means to be married. Lauer and Yodanis’ definition is a 
supplement to Cherlin’s in which marriage is considered both an informal and formal institution. 
 
This thesis uses the theoretical framework from Cherlin about deinstitutionalization and the 
conception of marriage as an institution. Furthermore, the conceptual understanding of institution 
from Lauer and Yodanis will be included as a supplement to Cherlin’s theory where an institution 
consists of formal rules as well as informal rules.  
 
4.4.	  Deinstitutionalization	  and	  alternatives	  to	  marriage	  
In the Oxford Dictionary the word deinstitutionalize is defined as either to “remove from an 
institution or from the effects of institutional life” or “make less institutional: reorganize on more 
individual lines” (Barber 2004). Thus, substantial changes have to take place for the institution of 
marriage to deinstitutionalize. Cherlin and Lauer and Yodanis have different understandings of 
what the concept of deinstitutionalization entails. Each of the definitions are important in the 
analysis of deinstitutionalization of Japanese marriage as they can lead to different understandings 
of the changes that have happened in Japan. Cherlin emphasizes the four development as part of the 
deinstitutionalization process (Cherlin 2004: 849). Each development contributes to the weakening 
of the institutional foundation of marriage. On the other hand, Lauer and Yodanis argue that the 
American institution of marriage has not undergone a process of deinstitutionalization (Lauer and 
Yodanis 2010: 59). Instead they stress that the emergence of alternatives to marriage do not imply 
that it has been deinstitutionalized. To them deinstitutionalization involves “a weakening of the 
rules, both formal and informal, of how to behave in marriage as well as the assumption of what 
marriage involves” (Lauer and Yodanis 2010: 61). Moreover, the institution of marriage has never 
covered alternative arrangements to marriage. Consequently, same-sex marriage, cohabitation, and 
childbirths outside marriage are not the right focus when considering and analysing 
deinstitutionalization (ibid.: 61-63). Cohabitation, childbirths outside marriage, and same-sex 
marriage do not necessarily imply a weakening of the rules of the marital institution because they 
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do not change the behaviour of people in a marriage. Lauer and Yodanis agree that an indicator of 
deinstitutionalization is the change of gendered roles in a marriage, which has taken place in Japan, 
as it revolves around roles within the marital institution (ibid: 61-62). However, opposite Lauer and 
Yodanis’ position, the three developments of cohabitation, extramarital childbirths, and same-sex 
marriage, have all made changes to the understanding of marriage and what it entails. Previously, 
living with a partner and having children were practised exclusively in a marriage, and same-sex 
marriages challenge conventional marriage because gay couples would like to be part of the marital 
institution on an equal footing with heterosexual couples. For same-sex marriage to be fully 
accepted in Japan it will require a change in both social norms and legal rules of marriage. Also, the 
acceptance and legalization of same-sex marriage entail a change in the current Japanese 
constitutional understanding of marriage (Chisaki 2015; McCurry 2015). Thus, one can argue that 
the assumptions of what marriage involves also change with this development. The two conceptions 
of deinstitutionalization presented by Cherlin and Lauer and Yodanis respectively sharpen the focus 
on the conceptual meaning of deinstitutionalization. Alternatives, as Lauer and Yodanis stress, may 
not be indicators of a deinstitutionalization. This would imply that of the four developments, only a 
changing gender division of labour in the home is an indicator of deinstitutionalization and not 
cohabitation, same-sex marriage, and extramarital childbirths. However, following Cherlin one can 
argue that both informal and formal rules of marriage as well as assumptions about marriage change 
with the four developments. The four developments have opened up for an acceptance of new living 
arrangements which previously have been reserved to marriage and a broadening of the conception 
of the marital institution itself. Therefore, Cherlin’s definition of deinstitutionalization will be used 
in the analysis, and the four developments are all considered part of the deinstitutionalization of 
marriage.  
	  
5.  Research	  question	  
With incorporation of the theoretical framework, this thesis aims at answering the following 
research question: 
 
In what way has the institution of marriage changed in Japan since the 1970s? 
 
To answer the research question, two sub questions have been chosen: 
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1)   What is characteristic for the change and possible deinstitutionalization of the Japanese marital 
institution, and are the developments distinctively Japanese or similar to developments in the 
West and other East Asian countries?  
2)   What has made the change in the Japanese marital institution possible? 
 
6.  Research	  design	  
A research design “provides the framework for the collection and analysis of data” in order to be 
able to answer one’s research question (Bryman 2012: 46). This section will present the ontological 
and epistemological position, method of historical institutionalism, data collection, criteria for 
social research, reliability and validity, reflections on ethical integrity of the research, and 
limitations in this thesis.  
	  
6.1.	  Ontology	  and	  epistemology	  
Ontology revolves around the nature of social phenomena (Bryman 2012: 32-33). This thesis takes 
a constructionist stance as social phenomena in this paper are not considered pre-given categories 
which are beyond the influence of social actors. Instead research will be highly influenced by the 
individual researcher’s perspective and approach. It has also been the case with the research 
conducted for this thesis. In constructionism social phenomena are susceptible to change because 
they are constantly being revised, and social actors produce categories through interaction. As a 
result, social reality is not definitive. Epistemology is about the nature of knowledge and the 
knowledge which is considered acceptable (ibid.: 27-30). This thesis follows the epistemology of 
interpretivism. The interpretivist epistemological position focuses on the interpretation of social 
action and its subjective meaning. Instead of finding explanations it is important to understand 
social behaviour and human action. It is central in this thesis as it focuses on marriage and the way 
social behaviour and the attitudes regarding marriage have developed among Japanese men and 
women.       
	  
6.2.	  Method	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  
As this thesis focuses on the marital institution in Japan and its historical development since the 
1970s, historical institutionalism is the chosen method.  
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Historical institutionalism puts an emphasis on contextualization and historical process of the 
emergence, reproduction, and development of institutions over time (Fioretos 2011; 372: Thelen 
1999: 369-370, 376, 382). Thus, factors such as time, place, norms, and culture are of interest in a 
historical institutionalist analysis. Together with rational choice institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism constitutes one of the three main schools of 
institutionalism. Like the two other approaches to institutionalism, historical institutionalism 
contains much internal diversity. Historical institutionalism is a broad term which covers research 
on different social science concerns but generally it can be understood as an approach to the study 
of politics and social change (Pierson 1996: 131; Steinmo 2008: 118, 125). The approach focuses 
on real-world empirical questions and historical institutionalists seek to answer their questions 
through empirical investigation. In historical institutionalism the importance of institutions is also 
emphasized (Steinmo 2008: 123-124, 126; Thelen 1999: 378-379). Particularly, historical 
institutionalists are interested in the way institutions influence individuals’ behaviour. Historical 
institutionalists investigate this by looking at historical documentation.       
 
Besides a shared focus on real-world questions and institutions’ structuring influence on behaviour, 
historical institutionalists also agree on the importance of the temporal and historical dimension of a 
social phenomenon (Pierson 1996: 131). In historical institutionalism, history matters in three 
important ways (Steinmo 2008: 127-128). First, the historical context of events will have a direct 
influence on following decisions and events. Second, actors learn from experience because 
behaviour happens in a certain social, political, economic, and cultural context. Third, expectations 
are shaped by the past. In this way history consists of events that are linked to each other and can 
influence one another. Therefore, temporality is important in a historical institutionalist analysis as 
the timing of events matter to a social process (Fioretos 2011: 371; Pierson 1996: 131). By 
analysing the temporal order of events, variables which might have an effect on later developments 
can be identified (Fioretos 2011: 381-382). Consequently, tracing the historical development can 
highlight different conditions, when they are present, and how they matter to a social process. 
History matters exemplifies why institutional arrangements persist but institutions also change over 
time (Steinmo 2008: 129; Thelen 1999: 396). Factors leading to institutional change are also 
important as institutions do change over time because “Institutions rest on a set of ideational and 
material foundations that, if shaken, open possibilities for change” (Thelen 1999: 397). Ideas are 
important in the analysis of institutional change (Steinmo 2008: 130). When actors have the will 
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and their ideas change, institutional change is likely to happen. Ideas can be understood as “creative 
solutions to collective action problems” (Steinmo 2008: 131). In this way institutions are involved 
in a dynamic process where their interplay with ideas and the environment facilitate an evolving 
process (Steinmo 2008: 133).  
 
With the method of historical institutionalism, the analysis of the change and possible 
deinstitutionalization of the marital institution in Japan will follow the historical development and 
opportunity of change. I will try to identify the marital changes, deinstitutionalization process, and 
developments which have lead to changes in the Japanese marriage. Moreover, I wish to show that 
despite change in some areas of the Japanese marital institution, the institution is rigid and seems 
unlikely to change in other areas at the present moment.  
 
6.3.	  Data	  collection	  
The collected data are secondary sources and consist primarily of survey data. Written documents 
which mainly contain statistical data have also been included. The surveys have been conducted by 
The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR). NIPSSR is a Japanese 
research institute which is affiliated to Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. It 
specialises in population and household trends and research regarding domestic and international 
social security policies and systems (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
2014). The survey from NIPSSR is the Fourteenth Japanese National Fertility Survey and carried 
out in 2010. It revolves around the current situation and background to marriage and fertility among 
married couples and singles (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2010a; 
1; National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2010b). The first National Fertility 
Survey was conducted in 1940 and since 1952 it has been conducted every five years. From 1982 a 
survey with unmarried respondents has been conducted together with the survey on married 
couples. The samples from the 2010 survey are based on stratified random sampling and consist of 
6,705 wives from first-marriage couples, where the current marriage is the first for one or both 
husband and wife, and a total of 10,581 single and never-married men and women.  
 
Besides survey data, documents have been collected and they consist of reports, journal articles, 
books, and newspaper articles. Primarily statistical data have been used from the documents and in 
some cases examples have been included from the documents to strengthen the arguments about 
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existing statistical data. The reports are two world fertility reports. They are produced by United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). One of DESAs main tasks is to 
compile, generate, and analyse economic, social, and environmental data and information the 
member nations can review (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2007; 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2014: 2). The data on Japan is collected 
by United Nations Statistics Division. The journal articles and books have been included to 
complement the report and survey data from NIPSSR. In some cases, surveys and other the 
statistical data have only been available in Japanese where the journal articles and books have 
presented data in English. Newspaper articles have been collected about same-sex marriage in 
Japan because of the very recent developments and the limited literature about the topic.  
 
6.4.	  Reliability	  and	  validity	  	  
Reliability and validity are important criteria for evaluating social research. For research to be 
reliable it has to have “consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by 
different observers or by the same observer on different occasions” (Silverman 2010: 275). 
Therefore, reliable research requires consistency in the measurement (Bryman 2012: 46). To meet 
the reliability criterion, the historical development of the marital institution has been followed 
chronologically. However, as reliability can be a concern in quantitative research it is important to 
consider the reliability of the statistical material in this thesis. In surveys respondents can only 
choose a response to a question among few categories. In this case it can be problematic if the listed 
categories reduce or do not capture the variation in the respondents’ answers. Also, most of the 
statistical data have been collected with intervals over the past 30 to 40 years. It is possible that 
during these years definitions of concepts or wording of questions in the surveys have changed 
slightly which can potentially result in less stable measurements.  
 
Reliability is also related to the validity of the research as reliability is a prerequisite for validity 
(Bryman 2012: 173). Validity can be understood as “truth: interpreted as the extent to which an 
account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers” (Silverman 2010: 275). It 
refers to the integrity of the conclusions drawn based on the research (Bryman 2012: 47). To meet 
the validity criterion, the analysis of the Japanese marital institution is focusing on timing and 
tracing the historical development of the institution. By including mainly quantitative data, the four 
types of validity, measurement validity, internal validity, external validity, and ecological validity 
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are also important to consider (ibid.: 47-48). Measurement validity is relevant for surveys because it 
is important that the questions reflect the concepts which are meant to be investigated. Internal 
validity concerns causality. Internal validity is central for this thesis. By looking at the temporal 
order of the events, factors which might have led to change in the marital institution can be 
identified. External validity concerns the possibility for generalization of a survey beyond the 
research subjects. Likewise it is of interest in this thesis to be able to generalize the trends in 
Japanese marriage patterns beyond the sample of respondents in the surveys. Ecological validity is 
important to consider when using quantitative data as it revolves around how well the findings of 
the study applies to natural social settings. Ecological validity can end up being limited as the 
survey might not capture respondents’ values and attitudes because the questionnaire creates an 
unnatural setting.    
 
6.5.	  Ethical	  considerations	  
Ethical considerations and integrity are essential in social research regardless of the topic under 
investigation (Bryman 2012: 130). Bryman highlights four main ethical issue areas: harm to the 
participant, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy, and deception (ibid.: 135, 138, 143). 
Consequently, research participants should not be harmed physically or mentally, they should be 
given sufficient information about the research to be able to make an informed decision about 
whether or not to participate, participants should decide the degree to which his or her privacy can 
be invaded, and participants should be informed about the researcher’s work and what it entails. 
Especially, ethical considerations are important when the research involves interaction between the 
researcher and human subjects. The research conducted for this thesis does not involve interaction 
with human subjects. Primarily, the data in this thesis consist of documents and survey data 
collected by different researchers. To some extent it can be easier for survey researchers to meet the 
ethical requirements because questions are made in advance and delineate the topic (Silverman 
2010: 175). Still, ethical integrity applies to all social research and should be taken into 
consideration when carrying out one’s own research.    
 
6.6.	  Limitations	  
When conducting research, it is important to consider one’s own role in process. The topic of this 
thesis is the change of the marital institution in Japan. It is a country specific topic, and 
unfortunately I do not understand or speak Japanese and I have only been in Japan for a relatively 
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short period of time as an exchange student. As a graduate student and foreigner from Denmark, I 
have only acquired knowledge about the topic of Japanese marriage and relationships from 
conversations with young Japanese men and women, general observation of couples’ interaction, 
lectures, and through English documents and statistical data. Like with a lot of other topics which 
are country specific, there is a substantial literature about Japanese marriage in the original 
language which I have not had the opportunity to explore. I am sure Japanese sources would have 
enriched this thesis substantially. Moreover, in the data collection process I discovered that 
statistical data from the 1970s regarding certain aspects of marriage and family in Japan is only 
available in Japanese. Thus, in some cases I have had to rely on statistical data from the 1980s. I 
have tried to meet the challenges and nuance the analysis by including both documents and 
statistical data. The sources and documents have been written by both foreign and Japanese 
scholars. Furthermore, pointing toward factors which have had an influence on both the change of 
the marital institution as well as its persistence can prove to be a difficult task. I do not claim to be 
able to cover all factors, but by consulting previous literature and research, I aim at highlighting 
important changes, possible deinstitutionalization process in the Japanese marital institution since 
the 1970s, and pointing out plausible and influential factors for the developments, changes, and 
continuities.  
 
7.  Analysis	  
In this section Cherlin’s theoretical framework will be used to analyse the change and possible 
deinstitutionalization of the Japanese marital institution. The section also includes an analysis of the 
rigid nature of Japanese marriage. The first part of the analysis focuses on the four developments of 
deinstitutionalization. The second part touches upon the cultural and material trends which are 
likely influential causes for the change in the Japanese marriage. The analysis of the four 
developments and cultural and material trends will follow their historical development. If available, 
data will be included from the 1970s. The third part highlights plausible explanations for the 
distinctive and rigid development of Japanese marriage.   
 
7.1.	  The	  four	  developments	  in	  the	  deinstitutionalization	  of	  Japanese	  marriage	  	  
Cherlin points out that the prevalence of cohabitation is a contributing factor to the change and 
deinstitutionalization of marriage (Cherlin 2004: 849). In Japan cohabitation is still not a living 
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arrangement many men and women choose but cohabitation experience has been rising (National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2010a: 12). The 2010 National Fertility Study 
shows that from 1987 to 2002 for women and from 1987 to 2005 for men the percentage for 
cohabitation experience has been rising for never-married Japanese men and women aged 19 to 34. 
For women the total percentage has increased from 2.8 percent to 7.6 percent and for men from 3.2 
percent to 7.9 percent. The lowest degree of experience with cohabitation is in the age group of 18 
to 19 years for both men and women. The low percentage of people who are 18 or 19 years old and 
have experience with cohabitation is most likely a result of their young age. At that age most young 
adults still live at home and do not have the financial resources to live alone with a partner. For men 
and women cohabitation experience increases throughout the years. Furthermore, men and women 
aged 25 to 29 become the cohort with most cohabitation experience after 1997 for men and 2002 for 
women. Together with the general rise in cohabitation for all age groups throughout the years, this 
suggests that cohabitation becomes a more common trend and at the same time men and women 
have started to cohabit earlier in life. The upward trend of experience with cohabitation changes to a 
slight decrease in cohabitation experience after 2002 for women and 2005 for men1. However, the 
data does not include married people. Following Raymo et al., people who are already married 
could also have had cohabitation experience (Raymo et al. 2009: 787, 792-793). Without including 
them in the data it can underestimate the prevalence of cohabitation. Including married men and 
women, 21 percent of men and women aged 25 to 34 had cohabitation experience in 2004. It is less 
frequent for the other age groups and lowest among the youngest aged 20 to 24 and the oldest 
cohorts aged 44 to 50 where cohabitation experience is 10 percent. Compared with The 2010 
National Fertility Study, the percentage is substantially higher when including married people’s 
cohabitation experience.       
 
Despite the general rise in cohabitation experience, the emergence of cohabitation has not emerged 
as an alternative union among Japanese men and women (Raymo et al. 2009: 786-787). In Cherlin’s 
argument about deinstitutionalization of marriage, he stresses that since cohabitation emerged in the 
U.S. and other western countries in the 1970s it has become an accepted alternative to marriage 
(Cherlin 2004: 849). It is also true for Western European countries like France and Sweden (Cherlin 
2004: 849; Raymo et al. 2009: 787). Cohabiting unions can provide many of the benefits 
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  See Appendix, table 1 and figure 1 and 2. 
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individuals can get from marriage such as shared residence, sexual access, companionship, and love 
(Raymo et al. 2009: 790; Tokuhiro 2009: 92). At the same time cohabitation does not entail a legal 
commitment and most likely there is not the same pressure to have children and subsequently 
provide for a family. Despite the benefits of cohabitation, following the historical development of 
experience with cohabitation from 1987 to 2005 it becomes apparent that cohabitation is not an 
outspoken phenomenon in Japan (Raymo et al. 2009: 785, 793, 799). Moreover, the cohabiting 
relationships typically last a short period of time of on average less than two years and are as likely 
to end as to lead to marriage. On average 58 percent of cohabiting unions end in marriage today. 
Instead of being an alternative to marriage, cohabitation is better understood as a precursor to 
marriage in Japan.   
 
The second development in the deinstitutionalization of marriage is the emergence of legalized 
same-sex marriage (Cherlin 2004: 850-851). Legalization and acceptance of same-sex marriage 
open up to a reinterpretation of the formal rules as well as social norms of marriage. Consequently, 
by accepting same-sex marriage, marriage becomes a union which is no longer exclusively for 
partners of the opposite sex. Also, traditional and gendered division of labour in a household no 
longer apply. So far only small steps have been taken toward legalization of same-sex marriage in 
Japan. In March 2015 the Shibuya ward began recognizing same-sex-partnerships and it was 
followed by the Setagaya ward in July 2015. The 5th of November 2015 the first same-sex marriage 
certificates were issued to seven couples in the two Tokyo wards (Shusuke 2016; McCurry 2015). 
The certificate recognizes same-sex partnerships as equivalent to marriage. The ordinance is not 
legally binding, but it gives couples an opportunity to rent apartments together and hospital 
visitation rights to the same degree as family members. Rights which homosexual couples did not 
have before in Japan. The tentative steps toward equal marriage rights for same-sex couples may 
also reflect the divided opinion in the population. Following the the recognition of same-sex 
partnerships in March, NIPSS conducted a survey where 1,259 men and women aged 20 to 79 were 
asked about their attitudes toward gay marriage (Chisaki 2015; Koide 2015). According to the 
survey slightly more than half of the respondents, 51.1 percent, were supportive of gay marriage. 
When asked if the country’s law should be changed to allow same-sex unions the youngest 
Japanese men and women showed the highest support. More than 70 percent aged 20 to 39 
supported it. The support dropped notably to 38 percent for men and women aged 60 to 69 and to 
24 percent for people aged 70 to 79. The reserved attitudes toward gay marriage were also 
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cemented in other questions in the survey. A bit more than half of the respondents would not be 
supportive if they found out that either their male or female friend was gay. Moreover, 72 percent of 
the respondents would feel reluctant to accept it if their child was gay. 
 
Japan has experienced limited liberalization of pro-gay rights and same-sex marriage has not been 
legalized throughout the country. Thus, it shows that the issue of granting legal rights to same-sex 
couples is a recent phenomenon and has not been as pronounced as Cherlin highlights about the 
American case. In Japan this is partly a result of the sensitivity of the issue. The question of an 
individual’s right to marriage revolves around deeper issues about social and cultural ideologies of 
gender and family (Maree 2004: 542). Furthermore, political support has been limited. At the 
national level there has not been political will to grant equal marital rights to gay people (Chisaki 
2015; McCurry 2015). According to current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the constitution states that 
marriages involves mutual consent of both sexes and is consequently not referring to people of the 
same sex. Officials from the Shibuya ward have also stated that same-sex partnerships are notably 
different from the conventional marriage. So far same-sex partnerships are not considered 
equivalent to heterosexual marriages in Japan. The recent developments, the reluctant attitudes, and 
limited legal rights gay people have been granted, suggest that the emergence of same-sex marriage 
has not been an element of the deinstitutionalization process in Japan.  
 
The third development Cherlin points out is the changing division of labour (Cherlin 2004: 849). 
Cherlin stresses that where the man used to be the breadwinner and the woman was responsible for 
domestic tasks, traditional division of labour in the home has become less common today. It is to a 
greater extent up the individual couple to negotiate and find a suitable work arrangement. The same 
changes are likely to happen in Japan where a strong attitudinal change has taken place. The 2010 
Fertility Study among Japanese singles aged 18 to 34 shows that attitudes toward women’s life 
course have changed (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2010a: 15-16, 
30). In 1987 33.6 percent of never-married women thought that the ideal life course was to become 
a full-time housewife. Since then the amount of women in favour of this life course has been 
decreasing and in 2010 it was only 19.7 percent who had this opinion. Additionally, there has been 
an increase throughout the years in women who think that managing both work and family is the 
ideal life course. In 1987 18.5 percent of single women chose it as the ideal life course and 2010 it 
had increased to 30.6 percent. The decrease in the desire to become a full-time housewife is also 
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evident when never-married women are asked about their expected or intended life course. In 1987 
23.9 percent expected that they would become full-time housewives whereas the percentage 
dropped to 9.1 percent in 2010. Likewise, there has been an increase in women who expect to be 
single and working or manage both family and work and the amount has increased from 7.1 to 17.7 
percent and 15.3 to 24.7 percent respectively between 1987 and 2010. For men a similar 
development in attitudes has taken place. When asked about what type of life they want their 
partner or wife to lead, in 1987 37.9 percent of single men preferred that women became full-time 
housewives. This decreased to 10.9 percent in 2010. Similarly, men’s preference of women 
managing both work and family increased from 10.5 percent in 1987 to 32.7 percent in 20102. 
Moreover, when asked today about the idea that husbands should work and the wives should take 
care of the home after marriage, the majority of married women in their first marriage under the age 
of 35 and never-married men and women aged 18 to 34 favour a gender equal division of labour 
(ibid.: 23). 60.1 percent of never-married men, 64.7 percent of never-married women and 66.2 
percent of married women disagreed with with the idea of a traditional division of labour in 20103. 
 
Even though men and women voice a disagreement with traditional gender divided tasks in the 
home, the actual experiences of married women is not entirely supportive of the stated attitudes 
(National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2010b: 19). There has been a steady 
rise in women who continue working after marriage from 60.3 percent to 70.5 percent between 
1985 to 2009. Still, a substantial amount of women tends to leave the labour market after they have 
children. It has not changed much from 1985 to 2009. In this time period it has remained just under 
40 percent for the first child and around 70 to 80 percent for the second and third child4. 
Additionally, the actual experience is supported by present attitudes. When presented to the idea 
that it is desirable that mothers should not work and should stay home at least when their children 
are young, the large majority of never-married men and women aged 19 to 34 and married women 
under the age of 35 years and in their first marriage agreed with this in 2010 (National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research 2010a: 23). 73.3 percent of never-married men, 75.4 
percent of never-married women, and 66.2 percent of married women supported this view5.  
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  See Appendix, table 2 and figure 3, 4 and 5. 
3	  See Appendix, table 3. 
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  See Appendix, table 4 and figure 6.	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Like Cherlin highlights about the division of household labour in the American marriage, Japan has 
also experienced a significant change in attitudes toward the division of labour in the household in 
the time period between 1987 and 2010. When asked about their attitudes regarding the division of 
labour in the household, single Japanese men and women appear to be more in favour of a division 
where the couple can figure out the arrangements which work for them. It also seems to be the case 
when looking at the actual experiences of married women, where an increasing proportion of 
women tend to keep their jobs after marriage. Nevertheless, between 1985 and 2009 not much has 
changed in regard to the percentage of women who stay in the labour market after childbirth. 
Therefore, when a couple start a family women carry most of the responsibility for childrearing. 
Even though data is not available from the the 1970s and until the late 1980s and the experience of 
married women after childbirth resembles the traditional division of labour, the strong change in 
attitudes opposing traditional gender roles and household tasks is likely to be an indicator of a 
deinstitutionalization process of Japanese marriage.    
 
The fourth development facilitating deinstitutionalization of marriage is the rise in extramarital 
childbirths (Cherlin 2004: 849). Since the late 1970s one sixth of childbirths in the U.S. happened 
outside marriage, and in the early 2000s it had increased to one third. Based on this development 
Cherlin argues that today marriage is not a prerequisite for having children like it was fifty years 
ago. However, as mentioned above, Japan has experienced very few extramarital births since the 
1970s (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2007; United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2014: 16-17, 65). In 1970 the percentage of 
extramarital childbirths among all births was 0.9 percent. In 1995 it had increased to 1.2 percent, in 
2004 to 2.0 percent and in 2010 to 2.1 percent6. Even though Japan has experienced a small rise in 
extramarital childbirths in forty years, the percentage of childbirths outside marriage remains a 
limited proportion of total births in the country. The slow development is also reflected in the 
attitudes toward childbearing outside marriage (National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research 2010a: 23). When asked if it is all right to have children without getting married, 39.1 
percent of wives from first-marriage couples under the age of 35 supported this view in 2010. On 
the other hand the majority of 57.9 percent disagreed. Likeminded attitudes exist for single and 
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never-married men and women aged 19 to 34 when they are asked the same question. In 2010 31.6 
percent of men and 33.7 percent of women supported extramarital childbirths. 64.7 percent of men 
and 62.9 percent of women were against it7.  
 
The proportion of extramarital births has slightly increased since 1970 but continues to be 
negligible today. Moreover, it does not seem likely to change drastically anytime soon. The trend of 
extramarital childbirths has not been as outspoken in Japan as it has in the U.S. This may reflect the 
way in which traditional social norms persist alongside modern developments in marriage and 
family life. Besides a low percentage of extramarital births, childbearing outside marriage continues 
to be disapproved and stigmatized in society and children who are born to an unmarried mother are 
considered illegitimate (Rindfuss et al. 2009: 218-219). Furthermore, there has been a substantial 
increase of bridal pregnancies. The developments seem to support the persistence of social norms 
regarding childbearing in Japan. The low prevalence of extramarital births indicates, together with 
the late developments and mixed attitudes toward same-sex marriage and the characteristics of 
cohabitating unions, that Japanese marriage has not been deinstitutionalized.  
 
7.1.5.	  Formal	  and	  informal	  rules	  and	  marriage	  as	  a	  status	  symbol	  
The institution of marriage has changed in Japan since the 1970s which is expressed in the delay of 
marriage and increase in divorces and people opting out of marriage. Based on Cherlin’s theory and 
the concept of deinstitutionalization, social norms about the Japanese marriage have also changed to 
some extent but Japanese marriage has not been deinstitutionalized. Japan has experienced a 
significant attitudinal changes in favour of a more gender equal division of household labour among 
Japanese men and women from the late 1980s to 2010 (National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research 2010a: 15-16, 23, 30; National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research 2010b: 19). Furthermore, an actual change in women’s continued work participation after 
marriage has taken place. However, strong social norms regarding cohabitation, extramarital 
childbirths, and same-sex marriage continue to exist in Japan. Cohabitation is a more common 
living arrangement for Japanese couples today than it was in the late 1980s and increasingly 
younger men and women have cohabitation experience. Nevertheless, cohabitating relationships are 
relatively few, cohabitation is not an alternative to marriage like it is in many other industrialized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See Appendix, table 7.	  
	  
32	  
countries, and it is not a union in which childbearing is accepted. Extramarital childbirths continue 
to be stigmatized in society and the increase of childbirths outside marriage has been negligible 
since 1970. Recent acknowledgement of same-sex partnerships and strong support of same-sex 
marriage among younger generations of men and women point toward a slow liberalization of both 
formal and informal rules about the institution of Japanese marriage. In order to make a substantial 
and actual change in favour of same-sex couples, attitudinal changes have to be converted to a 
change in the existing law which currently exclude same-sex couples from legally recognized 
partnerships in most of Japan. Also, marriage has to be recognized on an equal footing with the 
conventional, heterosexual marriage. Thus, both informal and formal rules about the institution of 
marriage are important when considering its deinstitutionalization. Yet, the change of the marital 
institution in Japan has far from shared all of the same characteristics as the deinstitutionalization 
process in the U.S. It is due to the limited and relatively late development of pro-gay rights and low 
prevalence of alternative living arrangements and extramarital childbirths. Therefore, by following 
the historical development of Japan’s marital institution it is clear that it has changed since the 
1970s, but Japanese marriage has not been deinstitutionalized. 
 
Despite changes in Japan’s marital institution since the 1970s, marriage continues to be the norm in 
the country and the majority of Japanese men and women express that they could like to marry 
some day (Tokuhiro 2009: 2; Raymo et al. 2015: 479). Cherlin argues that marriage in the U.S. has 
become a status symbol (Cherlin 2004: 855). People would like to marry when they feel that their 
life with the partner is stable and they are financially secure. However, in Japan the reasons for 
marrying today appear to be predominantly a result of conformity and practical considerations 
(National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2010b: 4). When asked what the 
direct reason was that ultimately led to their decision to get married, 48.3 percent of wives from 
first-marriage couples answered that it was because they felt it was the appropriate age to get 
married. It is followed by 23.9 percent who answered that it was because they wanted to live 
together as soon as possible, and 20.2 percent answered that it was because of pregnancy. For 
respondents younger than 25 years old, 50 percent expressed that pregnancy was the reason for 
marrying. The high frequency of pregnant brides also seems to exemplify the stigma of having 
children outside marriage. 11.4 percent and 10.2 percent answered “Established economic base for 
married life” and “Work circumstances of either spouse” as the motive for marrying and less than 
10 percent chose the following options “Wanted to have children as soon as possible”, 
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“Recommended by parents or others”, “Saved enough money to get married” or “Friends or people 
the same age got married”. Even though marriage in the U.S. has become a status symbol and 
something couples postpone until they are in a stable relationship and have sufficient financial 
means they do not seem to be compelling reasons for marrying in Japan8.          
 
7.2.	  Causes	  for	  the	  change	  of	  the	  marital	  institution:	  Cultural	  and	  material	  trends	  
The first part of the analysis has explored the historical development of the change and possible 
deinstitutionalization process of Japanese marriage. In the second part, possible causes for the 
change of the marital institution are touched upon. Cherlin argues that the four developments have 
been a result of material and cultural trends that have taken place in the U.S. during the 20th century 
and prior to the deinstitutionalization process (Cherlin 2004: 851). This has led to a change the 
meaning of marriage from an institutional to a companionate and later an individualized marriage. 
However, pinpointing causes leading to changes and possibly deinstitutionalization can be difficult 
because marriage is a complex institution “embedded within a larger system of gendered family and 
kinship relationships that in turn are embedded within a socially specific economy and polity” 
(Davis and Friedman 2014: 4). Therefore, marital changes can be a result of multiple causes. In 
Japan the cultural trends of emotional satisfaction and individualism in a marriage and the material 
trend of the remarkable increase in educational advancement for women are likely factors behind 
the change in the marital institution in the 1970s. Closely related to women’s educational 
advancement is the increased participation in the labour market.  
                
7.2.1.	  Emotional	  satisfaction	  and	  individualism	  
The growth of the ideas and values of emotional satisfaction and individualism are cultural trends 
which have increasingly gained acceptance in the Japanese society (Raymo et al. 2015: 479-480; 
Tokuhiro 2009: 18). Earlier Japanese men and women were not able to marry without the parents’ 
permission. In the post-war years romance increasingly became the reason for marrying and since 
the late 1960s love marriages have exceeded the proportion of arranged marriages in Japan. 
Marriage is now based on mutual consent and the purpose is to a large extent emotional satisfaction 
and individual development (Tsuya and Bumpass 2004: 39; Yang and Yen 2011: 753; Rindfuss et 
al. 2009: 221). The proportion of arranged marriages have continued to drop throughout the years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See Appendix, table 8 and figure 7.	  
	  
34	  
(National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2010b: 4). In 1982 29.4 percent of 
marriages were either arranged through a marriage matchmaking agency or arranged introduction. 
The proportion decreased to 9.7 percent in 1997 and 5.2 percent in 2010. This is equivalent to the 
increase of romantic marriages. In 1935 only 13,4 percent of marriages were based on love 
(Kumagai 2008: 33). Additionally, the proportion of love marriages experienced a steady increase 
to 68.1 percent in 1982, 87.1 percent in 1997, and 88.1 percent in 20109 (National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research 2010b: 4).  
 
Besides emotional fulfilment and romantic love, Japan was also influenced by the West in terms of 
the growing importance of egalitarianism and individualism in its post-war years (Tokuhiro 2009: 
8-9, 97). The values of egalitarianism and individualism have been cultural trends influencing the 
changing meaning of marriage in Japan. Individualistic values are central to the idea of romantic 
love, and the growth of individualism is an important factor when explaining changes in marriage 
and family. The developments of individualism and personal fulfilment have influenced growing 
acceptance of the separation of sex from marriage. Furthermore, the changing norms toward 
individualistic values have opened up for a revision of traditional gender roles in the Japanese 
marriage in which collectivist goals have been challenged by individual development (Yang and 
Yen 2011: 753, 758). Still, it does not seem like individualism has grown to an extent that is 
comparable to the West (Raymo et al. 2015: 480). The limited rise of individualist ideas and values 
might also be a result of the clash between the changing attitudes of women and their role in society 
and expectations of childbearing and responsibility for domestic tasks. 
  
7.2.2.	  Educational	  and	  occupational	  advancement	  
A notable material development in the Japanese society and an important factor behind the delay of 
marriage and childbearing in Japan is increased access to education and especially higher education 
for women (Rindfuss et al. 2009: 227; Yang and Yen 2011: 752, 756-757). It is a consequence of 
expectations which follow from educational advancement. Educational advancement can heighten 
expectations to a spouse in terms of income potential. Moreover, more time is spent on finishing 
one’s education. The greater access to education can influence especially women’s marital 
decisions (Yang and Yen 2011: 752, 756). Through education women gain agency and self-
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determination. Education also exposes people to egalitarian values by presenting different views on 
family and society.  
 
With advancement to higher education, income improvement and other job opportunities become 
available (Rindfuss et al. 2009: 227). Educational advancement can provide social mobility of 
promotion which challenges the traditional division of labour in the household (Yang and Yen 
2011: 156-157). The trends of increasing occupational opportunities and delay of marriage are 
consistent with Becker’s economic theory of marriage, where the relationship between women’s 
earnings and marriage is negative as a consequence of women’s occupational and earning 
opportunities in Japan where traditional gender roles persist (Fukuda 2013: 120-21, 123-124). 
However, for cohorts born after 1970 a change has taken place in Japan. The relationship between 
women’s earnings and marriage was negative for the 1960 cohort in which women with higher 
earnings were less likely to marry than women with lower earnings. It has changed as the 
relationship for the 1970 cohort is positive. It suggests that women’s incomes are not considered an 
obstacle to marriage to the same extent as earlier. It is also supported by younger generations’ view 
on gender role division in the family. Like the above section on the changing division of labour in 
the Japanese home shows, attitudes supporting traditional gender roles have been less outspoken in 
recent years.  
 
To explore the influence of education on the change of the marital institution in Japan, data prior to 
the 1970s has been included. The increase in both men and women’s high school enrolment have 
increased substantially since 1960 where slightly under 60 percent advanced to upper secondary 
schools, including high schools and technical colleges (Brinton 2001: 128-129; National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research 2012). Since the mid 1990s upper secondary school 
education has become nearly universal. In higher education, including junior college, four-year 
college and university, the expansion has been pronounced from 1955 to 2010. For women there 
has been a significant rise in advancement to junior college from 2.6 percent to over 20 percent 
from 1955 to 1995. From 1995 the percentage has dropped and in 2010 only 10.8 percent of women 
advanced to junior college. At the same time, women’s university advancement has experienced a 
significant increase from 1955 to 1995, and in 1995 it was at the same level as junior college 
advancement at slightly over 20 percent. Since then the increase has been substantial and in 2010 
women’s four-year college and university advancement had nearly doubled to 45.2 percent. For 
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men the increase in higher education advancement has been in four-year college and university 
education. The vast majority of men has chosen four-year college and university advancement 
between 1955 and 2010. From 1955 to 2010 four-year college and university advancement has 
increased from 13.1 to 56.4 percent. In the same time period less than 3 percent of men has chosen 
junior college education10.  
 
With the increase of women’s educational advancement, women also experienced a rise in the 
participation in the labour market at the end of the 20th century (Brinton 2001: 31, 35, 135). 
However, the greater labour market participation has mostly been in part-time work. Women have 
been in a disadvantaged position in large firms where men have been preferred for permanent 
employment. In 1985 an the Equal Employment Opportunity Law was implemented in Japan to 
alleviate the inequalities in the labour market (ibid.: 27-28, 100-101). Before the passing of the law, 
women were mostly assigned to a non-career track because it was assumed that women would retire 
when they married or had children. As a result of the law women could now choose between a 
career track or a “mommy track” (ibid: 31-32, 35). Still, 15 years after the law was implemented it 
had a limited effect and the percentage of women working in administrative and managerial work 
had only increased from 0.9 to 1 percent. The preference for men over women to recruit for the 
managerial track was strengthened after the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s. A decade 
earlier Japan had a labour shortage which provided an opening for women to participate in paid 
employment but the favourable conditions turned with the recession where Japan came to 
experience the highest unemployment since World War II. The low demand for labour has kept 
women with higher education and married women in an unfavourable position in the labour market 
after the economic recession. Thus, together with the tendency of women who leave the labour 
market after childrearing the cost of marriage might be too high for educated women with a well-
paid job. The consequences for women if they withdraw from the labour market are loss of wages 
and a limited opportunity for regular employment when they re-enter the work force (Rindfuss et al. 
2009: 227). Consequently it can be more appealing to women with higher education, well-paid job, 
and long-term occupational ambitions to postpone marriage or not to marry at all. 
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By focusing on the historical development of Japan’s marital institution, plausible cultural and 
material trends leading to the changes and deinstitutionalization have been identified. Crucial to the 
changes seem to be cultural and ideational influences from the West of individualism, 
egalitarianism, and romantic love in the post-war years as well as the material trends of a notable 
advancement to higher education for especially women leading to better occupational opportunities.   
    
7.3	  Few	  cohabiting	  couples	  and	  extramarital	  childbirths	  
In Japan, cultural and material trends are likely to have facilitated changes in the marital institution. 
Even though changes have taken place, Japanese marriage is still a rigid institution. Like in the 
previous section, pointing out causes for institutional persistence and stability is a difficult task and 
most likely a result of several factors. In the third part of the analysis plausible explanations for the 
distinct development of Japanese marriage are touched upon.   
 
In Japan, widespread acceptance of same-sex marriage has been gradual like in the U.S. where gay 
marriage became legal across the country in June 2015 (Roberts and Siddiqui 2015). Likewise, 
Japan has experienced many of the same demographic developments taking place in the U.S. and 
Western Europe such as decline in childbirths, increase in divorce rate and single people, and delay 
of marriage and childbearing. Despite the similarities, developments such as a notable rise in 
cohabitating couples and increase in childbirths outside marriage have been almost absent in Japan 
(Atoh 2001: 1-2). Makoto Atoh highlights three explanations for the increase in cohabitation and 
extramarital childbirths in the western countries (ibid. 2001: 2-4). The first is the technological 
explanation. With the availability and prevalence of the oral contraceptive pill in the mid 1960s, 
women were independently able to control their own pregnancies. Also, it is likely to have 
promoted the “sex-revolution”. Young people engaged to an increasing extent in pre-marital sex 
and cohabitation because the pill reduced the risks of unwanted pregnancies. Extramarital 
childbirths followed as a consequence of the acceptance and increase of cohabitating relationships. 
The second explanation is women’s emancipation. In the 1960s more women started to experience 
an increase in educational advancement, participation in the labour market, and continued work 
after marriage and childbirth. The emancipation led women to enter cohabiting relationships where 
they desired a more equal partnership with men. The third explanation is value change. Younger 
people started to experience a weakening of religious beliefs. Instead values of individual freedom 
of choice including the freedom to choose to cohabit or have children outside marriage were 
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emphasized. The absence of the three developments might also contribute to the explanation of why 
the trends of cohabitation and extramarital childbirths are not as outspoken in Japan compared with 
the U.S. and Western Europe. First, the oral contraceptive pill was authorized for clinical purpose in 
the 1960s in Japan, but not legally authorized before 1999 (ibid.: 4-5, 16). Still, Japan experienced a 
“sexual revolution” where sexual intercourse increased during the 1980s and 1990s among students 
in junior high schools, high schools, and universities even though it continued to be less pronounced 
than in the western societies. Without a female-dominant contraceptive method before the late 
1990s it is possible that the unavailability of contraceptive pills has resulted in low prevalence of 
cohabitation and extramarital childbirths. Second, as mentioned above, women have experienced a 
substantial increase in advancement to higher education and attitudes toward traditional gender 
roles have started to change among Japanese men and women. Yet, women tend to leave the labour 
market during childrearing and in a marriage women are likely to carry the main responsibility of 
domestic tasks (ibid.: 5-6, 8). The general expectation of gender divided tasks in the home might 
have made it less attractive for women to cohabit with a partner in Japan. Third, secularism and 
individualism have developed gradually in post-war Japan but the developments are not as 
outspoken as in the western countries (ibid.: 6-8). Traditional familism continues to be valued 
where parent-children relationships are important and can challenge the husband-wife relationship. 
Moreover, self-reliance and independence from parents appear to be weak among unmarried 
working women aged 20 to 34 where over 80 percent cohabit with their parents.  
 
Atoh (2001) stresses the link between the rise in cohabitation and a corresponding rise in 
childbearing outside marriage. However, Japan has experienced a slow increase in cohabitation the 
past few decades and at the same time extramarital childbirths have remained stable around 2 
percent (Hertog 2009: 7; Hertog and Iwasawa 2011: 1676). If cohabitation induces extramarital 
childbirths it has most likely resulted in an increase in shotgun weddings or abortions. Ekateriana 
Hertog has analysed the reason behind the reluctance to have children outside marriage among 
never-married mothers. Previously economic and legal discrimination have been pointed out as 
obstacles to childbearing among never-married women (Hertog 2008: 196-197). Yet, economic 
discrimination has been reduced with the improvement of women’s employment, reduced earning 
gap between men and women, and narrowing of welfare provisions between divorced women and 
never-married women in recent decades. Also, less legal discrimination has taken place due to the 
abolition of the different way legitimate and illegitimate children used to be recorded in the 
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household registry. As a result, economic and legal discrimination are not sufficient to explain the 
low prevalence of extramarital childbearing. Instead Hertog argues that the low proportion of 
extramarital childbearing in Japan is a consequence of prevailing childbearing norms about a two-
parent nuclear family (ibid.: 199, 201, 212). The way the child develops is reflected in the parental 
care where the child learns through imitation and effort. Since there is a belief in a strong difference 
between the roles of male and female in the Japanese family, there is a need for a father who can be 
a role model. A child without a masculine role model can be considered worse off than children 
who grow up in a two-parent family. The belief in the effect different family constellations have on 
the child constitutes a problem for single and never-married mothers. 
 
8.  Conclusion	  
Since the 1970s Japan has experienced changes in its marital institution which has been evident 
from the delay of marriage and childbearing. Also, divorces have become more frequent and an 
increasing proportion of Japanese men and women decide not to marry at all. The tight link between 
marriage and childbearing has resulted in fertility below the replacement level which has become a 
concern politically and in society. Moreover, some of the changes in Japanese marriage are similar 
to marital changes in western countries as well as other East Asian countries. The changes which 
have already happened in the Japanese marriage, the societal concern, and the similarities of marital 
changes in the West and East Asia have been the motivation behind this thesis. It has led to the 
research question of in what way the institution of marriage has changed in Japan since the 1970s. 
By using Cherlin’s theory of deinstitutionalization of marriage it becomes evident that Japanese 
marriage has changed but it has not been deinstitutionalized. A clear attitudinal change among 
Japanese men and women has taken place in favour of more egalitarian gender roles and division of 
labour in the home, but Japan has experienced relatively few cohabiting unions, recent acceptance 
of same-sex partnerships, and marginal proportion of extramarital childbearing. Even though 
Japanese marriage has not been deinstitutionalized some of the same cultural and material trends 
seem to be key mechanisms behind the changes in Japanese marriage as in the U.S. Ideas and 
values such as the growth of emotional fulfilment and individualism and women’s advancement in 
higher education leading to better occupational opportunities are likely to have facilitated the 
marital changes in Japan. The rigidity and distinctiveness of Japanese marriage are reflected in the 
gradual rise in cohabitation and few extramarital childbirths. The rigidity of the marital institution 
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might be a consequence of the relative absence of certain developments in Japan, namely an early 
female-dominant contraceptive method, equal responsibility between husband and wife of domestic 
tasks, and a value change diminishing the importance of traditional beliefs. Furthermore, persistent 
childbearing and family norms seem to be a hindrance for extramarital childbearing. Therefore, the 
main characteristics of Japanese marriage since the 1970s have been the coexistence of institutional 
change and persistence regarding legal rules as well as social norms in the institution of marriage.  
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10.	  Appendix 
	  
	  
	  
	  	   Age	   1987	   1992	   1997	   2002	   2005	   2010	  
Men	   18-­‐19	  years	   1.2%	   0.9%	   0.6%	   1.8%	   0.9%	   0.5%	  
	  	   20-­‐24	  years	   3.5%	   4.2%	   4.5%	   6.0%	   5.7%	   2.5%	  
	  	   25-­‐29	  years	   3.3%	   6.7%	   7.1%	   10.3%	   11.8%	   8.6%	  
	  	   30-­‐34	  years	   5.0%	   7.1%	   6.0%	   6.9%	   9.9%	   8.9%	  
	  	   Total	   3.2%	   4.5%	   4.8%	   6.7%	   7.9%	   5.5%	  
	   Total	  number	  of	  cases	   3,299	   4,215	   3,982	   3,897	   3,139	   3,667	  
Women	   18-­‐19	  years	   1.9%	   1.3%	   2.6%	   3.0%	   1.7%	   0.2%	  
	  	   20-­‐24	  years	   2.7%	   3.1%	   4.4%	   7.5%	   6.7%	   5.0%	  
	  	   25-­‐29	  years	   4.1%	   4.5%	   5.3%	   10.0%	   10.1%	   8.0%	  
	  	   30-­‐34	  years	   4.4%	   6.1%	   7.6%	   8.2%	   10.6%	   9.3%	  
	  	   Total	   2.8%	   3.1%	   4.6%	   7.6%	   7.3%	   5.8%	  
	  	   Total	  number	  of	  cases	   2,605	   3,647	   3,612	   3,494	   3,064	   3,406	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Attitudes	  toward	  Marriage	  and	  Family	  among	  Japanese	  Singles:	  National	  Institute	  of	  Population	  
and	  Social	  Security	  Research	  2011.	  
Question:	  “Have	  you	  ever	  cohabited	  (lived	  with	  a	  partner	  without	  legally	  registering	  for	  marriage)?”	  1.	  
No,	  2.	  Yes,	  in	  the	  past,	  but	  not	  now,	  3.	  Yes	  I	  am	  (cohabiting)	  currently.	  
	  Table	  1:	  Cohabitation	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Figure	  1:	  Cohabitation	  men
Age	  18-­‐19	   Age	  20-­‐24	   Age	  25-­‐29	   Age	  30-­‐34	   Age	  Total
Percent
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Figure	  2:	  Cohabitation	  women
Age	  18-­‐19	   Age	  20-­‐24	   Age	  25-­‐29	   Age	  30-­‐34	   Age	  Total
Percent
Note:	  Same	  as	  table	  1	  
	  
Note:	  Same	  as	  table	  1	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   Survey	  
year	  
Fulltime	  
housewife	  
*	  
Return	  
to	  work	  
**	  
Managing	  
both	  work	  
and	  family	  
***	  
DINKS	  
****	  
Single	  
and	  
working	  
*****	  
Other/	  
unknown	  
Total	  
	  
1987	   33.6%	   31.1%	   18.5%	   2.5%	   3.7%	   10.7%	   100%	  
1992	   32.5%	   29.7%	   19.3%	   4.1%	   3.3%	   11.1%	   100%	  
1997	   20.6%	   34.3%	   27.2%	   4.4%	   4.4%	   9.2%	   100%	  
2002	   18.5%	   36.7%	   27.3%	   4.0%	   5.3%	   8.2%	   100%	  
2005	   18.9%	   33.3%	   30.2%	   4.1%	   5.1%	   8.4%	   100%	  
2010	   19.7%	   35.2%	   30.6%	   3.3%	   4.9%	   6.3%	   100%	  
	  
1987	   23.9%	   42.2%	   15.3%	   1.4%	   7.1%	   10.1%	   100%	  
1992	   19.2%	   45.8%	   14.7%	   2.6%	   9.5%	   8.2%	   100%	  
1997	   17.7%	   42.9%	   15.5%	   3.0%	   9.3%	   11.6%	   100%	  
2002	   13.6%	   41.8%	   17.5%	   4.0%	   12.5%	   10.6%	   100%	  
2005	   11.7%	   37.1%	   20.8%	   3.2%	   15.6%	   11.7%	   100%	  
2010	   9.1%	   36.1%	   24.7%	   2.9%	   17.7%	   9.5%	   100%	  
	  
1987	   37.9%	   38.3%	   10.5%	   0.7%	   0.8%	   11.9%	   100%	  
1992	   30.4%	   44.2%	   10.8%	   0.9%	   0.6%	   13.0%	   100%	  
1997	   20.7%	   43.4%	   17.0%	   1.5%	   1.0%	   16.4%	   100%	  
2002	   18.1%	   46.8%	   18.7%	   1.4%	   1.6%	   13.4%	   100%	  
2005	   12.5%	   38.7%	   28.2%	   2.8%	   3.0%	   14.7%	   100%	  
2010	   10.9%	   39.1%	   32.7%	   2.6%	   3.7%	   11.0%	   100%	  
	  Table	  2:	  Women’s	  ideal	  and	  intended	  life	  course	  and	  men’s	  preferences	  for	  wives	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Source:	  Attitudes	  toward	  Marriage	  and	  Family	  among	  Japanese	  Singles:	  National	  Institute	  of	  Population	  and	  Social	  
Security	  Research	  2011.	  	  
Note:	  the	  figures	  are	  for	  never-­‐married	  men	  and	  women	  aged	  18	  to	  34.	  
Question:	  Ideal	  life	  course	  of	  women:	  “Regardless	  of	  your	  actual	  life,	  what	  type	  of	  life	  do	  you	  consider	  to	  be	  ideal	  
for	  you?”	  (1987,	  1992)	  “What	  type	  of	  life	  is	  your	  ideal	  life”?	  (1997,	  2002,	  2005,	  2010).	  Intended	  life	  course	  of	  
women:	  “Considering	  your	  life	  up	  till	  now,	  what	  type	  of	  life	  do	  you	  think	  you	  will	  likely	  lead	  in	  the	  future?”	  (1987,	  
1992)	  “What	  type	  of	  life	  do	  you	  think	  you	  will	  likely	  lead,	  regardless	  of	  your	  ideal	  life?”	  (1997,	  2002,	  2005,	  2010).	  
Men:	  Life	  course	  expected	  of	  their	  partner:	  “What	  type	  of	  life	  do	  you	  want	  women	  to	  lead?”	  (1987,	  1992)	  “What	  
type	  of	  life	  do	  you	  want	  your	  partner	  (or	  wife)	  to	  lead?”	  (1997,	  2002,	  2005,	  2010).	  	  	  
*Full	  time	  housewife:	  get	  married	  and	  have	  children,	  leave	  work	  upon	  marriage	  or	  childbirth,	  and	  not	  to	  be	  
employed	  afterwards.	  **	  Return	  to	  work:	  get	  married	  and	  have	  children,	  leave	  work	  upon	  marriage	  or	  childbirth,	  
return	  to	  employment	  after	  finishing	  with	  child	  rearing.	  ***	  Managing	  both	  work	  and	  family:	  get	  married	  and	  have	  
children,	  continue	  working	  throughout	  one’s	  life.	  ****DINKS:	  get	  married	  but	  don’t	  have	  children,	  continue	  
working	  throughout	  one’s	  life.	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Figure	  3:	  Ideal	  life	  course	  of	  women
1987 1992 1997 2002 2005 2010
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Figure	  4:	  Intended	  life	  course	  of	  women
1987 1992 1997 2002 2005 2010
Percent
Note:	  Same	  as	  table	  2	  
	  
Note:	  Same	  as	  table	  2	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Table	  3:	  Husbands	  should	  work	  and	  wives	  should	  take	  care	  of	  the	  home	  after	  
marriage	  
	  
	   Agree	   Disagree	  
Never-­‐married	  men	   36.0%	   60.1%	  
Never-­‐married	  women	   31.9%	   64.7%	  
Married	  women	   30.9%	   66.2%	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Figure	  5:	  Men:	  expected	  life	  course	  of	  their	  partner
1987 1992 1997 2002 2005 2010
Percent
Note:	  Same	  as	  table	  2	  
	  
Source:	  Attitudes	  toward	  Marriage	  and	  Family	  among	  Japanese	  Singles:	  National	  Institute	  of	  
Population	  and	  Social	  Security	  Research	  2011.	  
Note:	  Figures	  for	  never-­‐married	  persons	  aged	  18	  to	  34	  and	  wives	  in	  their	  first	  marriage	  under	  35	  years	  
old.	  The	  number	  of	  cases	  is	  3,667	  for	  never-­‐married	  men,	  3,406	  for	  never-­‐married	  women,	  and	  1,776	  
for	  married	  women.	  
Question:	  “Husbands	  should	  work	  and	  wives	  should	  take	  care	  of	  the	  home	  after	  marriage”.	  
	  
	  
51	  
	  
	  
	  
Year	  of	  marriage	  
or	  childbirth	  
Wives	  working	  
before	  and	  after	  
getting	  married	  
Wives	  working	  
before	  and	  after	  
giving	  birth	  to	  the	  
first	  child	  
Wives	  working	  
before	  and	  after	  
giving	  birth	  to	  the	  
second	  child	  
Wives	  working	  
before	  and	  after	  
giving	  birth	  to	  
the	  third	  child	  
1985-­‐1989	   60.3%	   39.0%	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
1990-­‐1994	   62.3%	   39.3%	   81.9%	   84.3%	  
1995-­‐1999	   65.1%	   39.3%	   76.8%	   78.1%	  
2000-­‐2004	   70.9%	   39.8%	   79.4%	   78.4%	  
2005-­‐2009	   70.5%	   38.0%	   72.8%	   82.9%	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Figure	  6:	  Wives'	  employment	  after	  marriage	  or	  childbirth
Wives	  working	  before	  and	  after	  getting	  married
Wives	  working	  before	  and	  after	  giving	  birth	  to	  the	  first	  child
Wives	  working	  before	  and	  after	  giving	  birth	  to	  the	  second	  child
Wives	  working	  before	  and	  after	  giving	  birth	  to	  the	  third	  child
Percent
Source:	  Marriage	  Process	  and	  Fertility	  of	  Japanese	  Married	  Couples:	  National	  Institute	  of	  Population	  and	  Social	  
Security	  Research	  2011.	  
Note:	  The	  proportion	  of	  wives	  who	  continued	  working	  after	  getting	  married	  or	  giving	  birth	  among	  wives	  who	  
had	  jobs	  at	  the	  time	  of	  marriage	  or	  pregnancy.	  
	  
	  
Note:	  Same	  as	  table	  4	  
	  
Table	  4:	  Wives’	  employment	  after	  marriage	  or	  childbirth	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  Table	  5:	  Mothers	  should	  stay	  at	  home	  during	  childrearing	  
	  
	   Agree	   Disagree	  
Never-­‐married	  men	   73.3%	   22.9%	  
Never-­‐married	  women	   75.4%	   21.5%	  
Married	  women	   66.2%	   30.7%	  
	  
	  Table	  6:	  Percentage	  of	  extramarital	  births	  among	  all	  births	  
	  
Year	   Extramarital	  births	  
1970	   0.9%	  
1995	   1.2%	  
2004	   2.0%	  
2010	   2.1%	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  Table	  7:	  Attitudes	  toward	  extramarital	  childbirth	  	  
	  
	   Agree	   Disagree	  
Never-­‐married	  men	   31.6%	   64.7%	  
Never-­‐married	  women	   33.7%	   62.9%	  
Married	  women	   39.1%	   57.9%	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Country	  Profiles:	  United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  
Social	  Affairs	  2007;	  World	  Fertility	  Report	  2013:	  Fertility	  at	  the	  Extremes:	  
United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  2014.	  	  
	  
Source:	  Attitudes	  toward	  Marriage	  and	  Family	  among	  Japanese	  Singles:	  National	  Institute	  of	  Population	  
and	  Social	  Security	  Research	  2011.	  
Note:	  Figures	  for	  never-­‐married	  persons	  aged	  18	  to	  34	  and	  wives	  in	  their	  first	  marriage	  under	  35	  years	  
old.	  The	  number	  of	  cases	  is	  3,667	  for	  never-­‐married	  men,	  3,406	  for	  never-­‐married	  women,	  and	  1,776	  
for	  married	  women.	  
Question:	  “It	  is	  all	  right	  to	  have	  children	  even	  if	  one	  is	  not	  married”.	  
	  
Source:	  Attitudes	  toward	  Marriage	  and	  Family	  among	  Japanese	  Singles:	  National	  Institute	  of	  Population	  
and	  Social	  Security	  Research	  2011.	  
Note:	  Figures	  for	  never-­‐married	  persons	  aged	  18	  to	  34	  and	  wives	  in	  their	  first	  marriage	  under	  35	  years	  
old.	  The	  number	  of	  cases	  is	  3,667	  for	  never-­‐married	  men,	  3,406	  for	  never-­‐married	  women,	  and	  1,776	  
for	  married	  women.	  
Question:	  “It	  is	  desirable	  that	  mothers	  should	  not	  work	  and	  should	  stay	  at	  home	  at	  least	  when	  their	  
children	  are	  young”.	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Motives	  for	  
marrying	  
Under	  25	   25	  to	  29	   30	  to	  34	   35	  or	  older	   Total	  
Saved	  enough	  
money	  to	  get	  
married	  
5.0%	   5.2%	   2.5%	   2.6%	   4.2%	  
Established	  
economic	  base	  
for	  married	  life	  
8.5%	   12.6%	   12.0%	   12.0%	   11.4%	  
Work	  
circumstances	  
of	  either	  spouse	  
4.6%	   12.8%	   11.6%	   8.5%	   10.2%	  
Wanted	  to	  live	  
together	  as	  
soon	  as	  possible	  
28.1%	   22.7%	   19.3%	   30.8%	   23.9%	  
Felt	  it	  was	  the	  
appropriate	  age	  
to	  get	  married	  
24.6%	   53.9%	   57.8%	   55.6%	   48.3%	  
Wanted	  to	  have	  
children	  as	  soon	  
as	  possible	  
5.8%	   7.2%	   8.7%	   8.5%	   7.4%	  
Became	  
pregnant	  	  
50.0%	   12.4%	   11.6%	   6.0%	   20.2%	  
Friends	  or	  
people	  the	  
same	  age	  got	  
married	  
1.9%	   3.1%	   2.2%	   1.7%	   2.5%	  
Recommended	  
by	  parents	  or	  
others	  
5.8%	   6.0%	   9.5%	   9.4%	   7.1%	  
Other	   3.5%	   5.4%	   6.2%	   9.4%	   5.5%	  
Source:	  Marriage	  Process	  and	  Fertility	  of	  Japanese	  Married	  Couples:	  National	  Institute	  of	  Population	  
and	  Social	  Security	  Research	  2011.	  
Note:	  Figures	  for	  first-­‐married	  couples	  who	  got	  married	  within	  five	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  survey	  in	  2010.	  
Question:	  “What	  are	  the	  direct	  reasons	  that	  ultimately	  led	  to	  your	  decision	  to	  get	  married?	  Please	  
choose	  up	  to	  2	  responses	  from	  the	  options	  below	  and	  circle	  the	  numbers.”	  
	  Table	  8:	  Motives	  for	  decision	  to	  get	  married	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  Table	  9:	  Love	  marriage	  and	  arranged	  marriage	  
	  
Survey	  year	   Love	  marriage	   Arranged	  
marriage	  
Other/Not	  
known	  	  
Total	  
1982	   68.1%	   29.4%	   2.5%	   100%	  
1987	   74.0%	   23.3%	   2.7%	   100%	  
1992	   82.7%	   15.2%	   2.0%	   100%	  
1997	   87.1%	   9.7%	   3.1%	   100%	  
2002	   87.8%	   6.9%	   5.2%	   100%	  
2005	   86.9%	   6.4%	   6.8%	   100%	  
2010	   88.1%	   5.2%	   6.8%	   100%	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Figure	  7:	  Motives	  for	  decision	  to	  get	  married
Saved	  enough	  money	  to	  get	  married Established	  economic	  base	  for	  married	  life
Work	  circumstances	  of	  either	  spouse Wanted	  to	  live	  together	  as	  soon	  as	  possible
Felt	  it	  was	  the	  appropriate	  age	  to	  get	  married Wanted	  to	  have	  children	  as	  soon	  as	  possible
Became	  pregnant	   Friends	  or	  people	  the	  same	  age	  got	  married
Recommended	  by	  parents	  or	  others Other
Percent
Source:	  Marriage	  Process	  and	  Fertility	  of	  Japanese	  Married	  Couples:	  National	  Institute	  of	  Population	  and	  
Social	  Security	  Research	  2011.	  
Note:	  Figures	  for	  first-­‐married	  couples	  who	  got	  married	  within	  five	  years	  prior	  to	  each	  survey.	  “Arranged	  
married”	  means	  “through	  an	  arranged	  introduction”	  or	  “through	  a	  marriage	  match-­‐making	  agency.”	  
“Love	  marriage”	  include	  meeting	  the	  following	  ways	  or	  places:	  “At	  the	  work	  place	  or	  through	  work”,	  
“Through	  friends	  or	  siblings”,	  “At	  school”,	  Around	  town	  or	  during	  a	  trip”,	  “Through	  various	  activities	  
(hobbies,	  etc.)	  or	  an	  adult	  education	  class”,	  “Through	  a	  part-­‐time	  job”,	  or	  “Childhood	  friend/neighbor”	  
Number	  of	  cases:	  1,298	  (1982),	  1,421	  (1987),	  1,525	  (1992),	  1,304	  (1997),	  1,488	  (2002),	  1,076	  (2005),	  
1,136	  (2010).	  	  	  
	  
Note:	  Same	  as	  table	  8.	  
	  
55	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2005 2010
Figure	  8:	  Love	  marriage	  and	  arranged	  marriage
Love	  marriage Arranged	  marriage Other/Not	  known	  
Percent	  
Note:	  Same	  as	  table	  9.	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Year	   Upper	  secondary	  schools	   Junior	  college	   Four-­‐year	  college/university	  
Male	   Female	   Male	  	   Female	   Male	   Female	  
1955	   55.4%	   47.4%	   1.9%	   2.6%	   13.1%	   2.4%	  
1960	   59.6%	   55.9%	   1.2%	   3.0%	   13.7%	   2.5%	  
1965	   71.7%	   69.6%	   1.7%	   6.7%	   20.7%	   4.6%	  
1970	   81.6%	   82.7%	   2.0%	   11.2%	   27.3%	   6.5%	  
1975	   91.0%	   93.0%	   2.6%	   20.2%	   41.0%	   12.7%	  
1980	   93.1%	   95.4%	   2.0%	   21.0%	   39.3%	   12.3%	  
1985	   93.1%	   95.3%	   2.0%	   20.8%	   38.6%	   13.7%	  
1990	   94.0%	   96.2%	   1.7%	   22.2%	   33.4%	   15.2%	  
1995	   95.8%	   97.6%	   2.1%	   24.6%	   40.7%	   22.9%	  
2000	   96.3%	   97.7%	   1.9%	   17.2%	   47.5%	   31.5%	  
2005	   97.3%	   97.9%	   1.8%	   13.0%	   51.3%	   36.8%	  
2010	   97.8%	   98.3%	   1.3%	   10.8%	   56.4%	   45.2%	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
Source:	  National	  Institute	  of	  Population	  and	  Social	  Security	  Research	  2012;	  Akiyoshi	  2007:	  17.	  
Note:	  “Upper	  secondary	  schools”	  include	  those	  who	  advanced	  to	  high	  schools	  and	  technical	  colleges.	  	  
	  	  
	  Table	  10:	  Educational	  advancement	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Figure	  9:	  Educational	  advancement
Upper	  secondary	  schools	  Male Upper	  secondary	  schools	  Female
Junior	  college	  Male Junior	  college	  Female
Four-­‐year	  college/university	  Male Four-­‐year	  college/university	  Female
Percent
Note:	  Same	  as	  table	  10.	  
